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Abstract: A framework is presented for incorporating maintenance into a dependability analysis
methodology for computer-based systems. Two types of maintenance are considered: failure-driven
maintenance and time-driven maintenance. Failure-driven maintenance or repair is carried out when the
system (or component) performance deviates from its expected performance and consists of all tasks
performed to restore the functional capabilities of failed items, principally diagnosis and repair. Time-
driven or scheduled maintenance is conducted on a speci c time schedule in order to prevent system
failure.
There may be dependencies between different components of a system with regard to their
maintenance plans. These dependencies arise either because a component has maintenance priority over
one or more components or because the maintenance of a certain component implies the maintenance of
other components. Constructs are presented for modelling these dependencies in the context of dynamic
fault tree analysis and a methodology is developed for solving the fault tree. The dynamic fault tree
constructs effectively capture the failure dependencies between components. The approach is illustrated
with an example based on a water deluge system.
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NOTATION
fi failure rate of component i
rj repair rate of component j
Dk probability of detecting the failure of
component k
hw1 processor (hardware) component
hw2 processor (hardware) component in
spare
v1 valve component 1
v2 valve component 2
1 INTRODUCTION
In broad terms, all operations that are conducted on a
system in order to retain its components and keep it in
good condition are considered to be maintenance. The
state of a system depends on the failure characteristics of
its components and the maintenance plan which is
conducted on the system. Computer-based systems are
often upgraded periodically, as part of their maintenance
plan. The upgraded versions often have different failure
characteristics. Therefore it is necessary to take the
maintenance plan into consideration in order to obtain an
accurate dependability model of the system.
Maintenance for computer-based systems can be
classi ed according to the reason why it is conducted.
With regard to this classi cation scheme, maintenance
can be failure-driven or time-driven. Failure-driven
maintenance occurs when the system is maintained upon
detection of a component failure. Time-driven or
scheduled maintenance is performed on a predetermined
schedule. A maintenance plan may combine both types of
maintenance, repair some components upon their failure
and maintain some components strictly on a  xed
schedule.
An example water deluge system is explained in the
next section. First there is a presentation of the dynamic
fault tree constructs to model failure dependencies and
later the constructs to model maintenance are added.
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2 SAFETY SYSTEM DESCRIPTION (WATER
DELUGE SYSTEM)
The water deluge system [1] used to illustrate the
dependency methodology is shown in Fig. 1. The features
of this system are typical of water spray systems used in
many different off-shore industries. Four pumps are used
to provide the water demand to the ring-main. The ring-
main transports the water around the platform to the
take-off points, where it is used to protect against the
hazards posed by hydrocarbon  res and explosions.
Pressure in the ring-main is maintained by a jockey pump
(not shown in the  gure). When the take-off valves open
and water is delivered to the spray nozzles the ring-main
pressure will drop. Ring-main pressure is monitored and
transmitted to the computer control system by the three
pressure transmitters (PS1 to PS3). When two of the three
transmitters indicate a low ring-main pressure the main
pumps are activated in the order indicated from top to
bottom of the diagram (i.e. EP1, EP2, DP1, DP2). As long
as two pumps are available water can be delivered at the
required rate to satisfy demand. Four pumps provide
redundancy in the system. Pumps 1 and 2 are electric
powered and pumps 3 and 4 are the diesel back-ups.
The features on each pump stream are identical. As the
water supply is direct from the sea a  lter is  tted on each
stream. Manual isolation valves are located on either side
of the pump for maintenance purposes. A pressure relief
valve provides protection for the pump and a test valve on
each line enables individual pumps to be tested without
fully activating the deluge system.
There are two failure modes of concern for each
stream; the  rst is that it fails to start (unavailable) and
the second is that it fails once running (unreliable). If a
pump stream activates on demand it means that the  lter,
isolation valves, test valve and pressure relief valve,
which are all (for this function) passive components, are
in the working condition. As they are passive they are
unlikely to fail in the relatively short running times if they
work initially. These are static failure modes. The pump
is, however, a dynamic component and can also fail once
while running. System failure will occur if fewer than
two of the four streams can be activated (i.e. three of four
fail).
3 FAULT TREE MODEL OF EXAMPLE
SAFETY SYSTEM
The computer control system consists of the three
pressure sensors (of which two are needed), plus the
hardware and the software. The hardware consists of
redundant processors in hot standby mode, each equipped
Fig. 1 Schematic representation of the deluge system pump stream
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with identical software. While the spare processor is in
spare mode, it is monitoring the inputs and outputs of the
primary, in order to provide detection and recovery in the
case of error. When an error is detected, control is
switched to the back-up processor. The computer control
system can thus tolerate a single (detected) hardware or
software failure. However, an undetected error causes
failure of the computer subsystem regardless of the state
of the back-up. This latter case (undetected error) is an
example of an uncovered (or unrevealed) fault, which
leads to immediate system failure. Another example of an
uncovered fault is a software fault that affects both
processors simultaneously. It might be expected, since
the software on both processors is identical, that all
software faults would affect both processors. However,
there is  eld data to support the assumption that a large
percentage of software faults will affect only a single
processor [2]. Modelling uncovered faults is crucial to the
analysis of a fault-tolerant computer system, and is
discussed in more detail in references [3] and [4]. A fault
tree model showing the failure of the computer system is
shown in Fig. 2, in which the basic events represent
hardware (processors), software and the sensor set.
Next consider the pump system, consisting of the four
pumps, their power sources (two are electric and two are
diesel) and their pump streams (associated valves and
 lters). For now, the pump streams and power supplies
will be ignored; attention will be concentrated on the four
pumps.
The set of four pumps operate in standby redundancy
in that the two electric pumps are started  rst, and the
diesel pumps provide replacements when the electric
pumps are unavailable. On demand, pumps EP1 and EP2
are turned on. If one of these two should fail, it is replaced
by DP1. The second pump failure is replaced by pump
DP2. This dynamic redundancy scheme introduces
dependencies between the failures and requires special
modelling techniques. A pump which is in use experi-
ences a different failure rate than one in standby.
Therefore, there is a need to keep track of which pumps
are being used and which are in standby. A spare gate is
used to model the failure dependencies that arise from the
use of spares. A spare gate is one of several dynamic
gates introduced in reference [5] and it is used to model
several dependencies associated with the use of spares.
Firstly, a component which is used as a spare has an
associated dormancy factor, a, which is a multiplicative
factor to the active failure rate to produce the spare failure
rate. If the dormancy factor is zero, the spare is said to be
a cold spare; a cold spare cannot fail before being
switched into active operation (failure to activate is
modelled as an uncovered failure). If the dormancy factor
is unity, then the spare is said to be a hot spare and can
fail at the same rate as when active. The in-between
situation is referred to as a warm spare; a warm spare can
fail before being switched into active operation, but does
so at a lower rate than when active.
The second dependency handled by the spare gate is
the use of pooled spares, which are spares that can be
used as a replacement for whichever of a set of
components fails  rst. When modelling pooled spares
there is a need to keep track of not only the state of each
component but also the order in which they have failed, in
order to determine which spare is being used where.
Further, it might be the case that components have
preferences for replacements, in that there is a priority or
order in which spares are utilized. This order may well be
different for different components.
The spare gate has a set of at least two inputs, the  rst
(leftmost) of which is the designated primary, and the
second and subsequent (from left to right) are the spares.
When the primary fails, it is replaced (in order) by the
spares which are still available (i.e. not failed and not
used elsewhere). The single output of the spare gate
returns true when the primary and the spares have been
exhausted. Basic events representing spares have failure
rates, coverage factors and dormancy factors.
Continuing to ignore the power supplies and pump
streams, the fault tree in Fig. 3 models the pumps and
their spares. The pump system fails when there are no
longer two available pumps (thus the OR gate with two
inputs). The basic events labelled EP1 and EP2 represent
the two electric pumps, which are both initially active (on
Fig. 2 Fault tree model of the computer system in the water
deluge system
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demand). The two diesel pumps (DP1 and DP2) are
pooled spares shared by both electric pumps. The  rst
electric pump failure is replaced by DP1 and the second
by DP2. Note that if there is a preference for EP2 to be
replaced by DP2 then the order of DP1 and DP2 inputs on
the second spare gate could be switched.
Next the power supplies will be considered. There is an
electrical power supply for pumps EP1 and EP2 and a
diesel supply for DP1 and DP2. If a power supply fails,
then the associated pumps are unavailable (essentially
failed). This type of functional dependency of one
component on another is easily modelled with a
functional dependency gate [5]. The functional depen-
dency gate has a trigger input and one or more dependent
inputs; when the event associated with the trigger input
occurs, the dependent inputs are then forced to occur. The
functional dependency gate can be used to model the
functional dependence of the pumps on the power
supplies: the power supply is the trigger event and the
two pumps are the dependent events. This is shown in the
fault tree in Fig. 3.
Using the demand dependency construct [6], the static
analysis of the pump stream can be separated from the
dynamic analysis of the pumps themselves. The demand
dependency construct can be used to model the
dependence on demand of the pumps on the pump
stream. The pump stream is the trigger event and the
pump is the dependent event. The implication of this
construct is that the pumps can fail to start on demand due
to the unavailability of the pump stream. Since the
unavailability of the pump stream at the moment that
demand occurs determines whether the corresponding
pump is available, the demand dependency construct is
designed to re ect a snapshot of the pump stream. The
corresponding fault tree can be seen in Fig. 4.
4 PROBLEMS THAT NEED TO BE
ADDRESSED
In order to  nd the dependability measures of the system,
 rst the availability measures of the system components
at the time that a demand occurs need to be found and
then the probability that the system performs satisfacto-
rily for the duration of demand. The problem that is
addressed in this paper is of  nding the availability
measures of the system components at the time that
demand occurs. These availability measures are used to
 nd the dependability measures of the entire system,
which is done automatically using the DDEP gate as
de ned in reference [7].
Fig. 3 Fault tree showing the pump system for the water deluge system
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The issues involved in  nding the availability
measures of the system components at the time of
demand are the following:
1. The system components are periodically maintained.
Once scheduled maintenance is conducted on the
system, all the components are brought up to an ‘as
good as new’ situation.
2. In addition to scheduled maintenance at  xed points in
time, the system components are also surveyed
continuously and repaired if a failure is detected in
them. However, the probability of detecting a failure in
a survey is not one.
3. There is dependency in the maintenance of some
components. If a failure is detected in any of the
valves, all of them must be maintained. This is an
example of a maintenance implication. A maintenance
implication arises when the maintenance of one
component implies that other components in the same
group will also be maintained. Further, the processor
has priority over its spare; i.e. the processor must be
maintained  rst if both the processor and its spare are
Fig. 4 Fault tree showing the pump stream using the DDEP gate for the water deluge system
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in a failed condition. This is an example of a
maintenance priority. A maintenance priority is used
to specify that the maintenance of one component must
precede the maintenance of another, should they both
need repair.
These are issues that need to be addressed in the case of
the water deluge system. In the following section, a
description is given of the issues that exist in the general
case for the maintenance of computer-based systems, and
the approach used to address these issues.
5 GENERAL APPROACH TO THE
MAINTENANCE MODELLING OF
COMPUTER-BASED SYSTEMS
5.1 Maintenance schemes
In this section, the several possible maintenance schemes
are discussed. These maintenance schemes can relate to
the maintenance behaviour of one component or they can
imply some kind of dependence between two or more
components. In the case where the behaviour implies
some sort of dependence between one or more compo-
nents, constructs can be de ned in the context of dynamic
fault trees to connect the components in question together
and show the behaviour. These constructs are then
incorporated into the fault tree of the system. Also, the
independent maintenance behaviour of components are
considered in the component characteristics of a fault
tree. Thus the fault tree can represent the maintenance
behaviour of the system in addition to its failure
behaviour.
5.1.1 Priority issues
It may be necessary to conduct maintenance on one or
more components before a component in question can be
maintained; i.e. one component may be more critical than
another and thus has higher priority. This situation is
modelled using the construct in Fig. 5. In this  gure, two
different situations have been shown. The left-hand side
of the  gure shows that component C cannot be
maintained before component B is maintained, and
component B cannot be maintained before component
A. The right-hand side shows that component A needs to
be maintained before all other components of the system.
Priority issues create dependencies between components.
5.1.2 Maintenance implications
Sometimes the system structure might be such that it
would be meaningless to repair a certain component
without maintaining some other component. This in-
dicates a repair dependency between the two components
in question. Therefore, the maintenance or repair of a
component would imply the repair or maintenance of
some other component. This relationship could be mutual
between two components, i.e. the repair of any of the two
components could imply the repair of the other com-
ponent. Maintenance implication constructs are shown
in Fig. 6. The repair implication construct between
components A and B shows that component B must be
repaired every time component A is repaired and the
repair condition construct shows that the repair of either
of the components A or B implies the repair of the other.
5.1.3 Upgrading components
Computer-based systems can be upgraded periodically.
The system failure parameters can change after the
upgrade since the new upgraded version is likely to have
different failure parameters. Therefore it is important to
keep track of the upgrade information. If an upgrade
changes the failure parameter of the up-graded compo-
nent, but does not impact other components or create any
kind of dependencies between components, it can be
considered a component characteristic, and it is not
necessary to show it with a fault tree construct. If an
upgrade creates dependencies, e.g. if two software
components must be upgraded simultaneously, then the
implication construct can be used to capture this
behaviour.
5.1.4 Maintenance frequency
Different components of a system may have various
maintenance schedules. Some components may be
Fig. 5 Maintenance priority constructs Fig. 6 Maintenance implication constructs
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maintained only upon failure, while other components
may be maintained on a predetermined schedule. The
maintenance frequency of each component is a charac-
teristic of that particular component and does not impact
other components. Therefore this behaviour is captured in
the component characteristics.
5.1.5 Summary
The maintenance plan for a system can be expressed as a
combination of the schemes mentioned above. The
present approach is to divide the entire maintenance plan
into its various schemes and then consider each scheme
separately and include it in the system model. The
solution of this model yields the dependability measures
of the maintainable system.
5.2 Analysis of maintainable systems
The problem addressed in this section is the solution of
the fault tree structures developed in the previous section.
The approach used here is to modularize the maintainable
system fault tree and solve each of the independent
modules for their dependability measures and then
combine the measures of each module to obtain the
system dependability. The approach therefore consists of
three consecutive steps:
1. Modularize the maintainable system fault tree into its
independent subtrees.
2. Solve each independent module for its reliability
(availability) measures.
3. Combine the results to obtain the system dependability
measures.
5.2.1 Modularization
The modularization of the maintainable system fault tree
entails  nding subtrees that are independent in their
failure characteristics as well as their maintenance
characteristics. Two subtrees are considered independent
in their failure characteristics if they do not have any
common basic events. The most ef cient and simple
algorithm is the approach presented by Dutuit and Rauzy
[8]. This is a linear-time algorithm that can detect
modules in fault trees.
Two modules are de ned to be independent in their
maintenance characteristics if they are not connected
with either of the ‘maintenance priority’ or ‘maintenance
implication’ constructs. If they are connected by any of
these gates then their maintenance characteristics show
dependencies, and they must therefore be modelled
together.
5.3 Solution of independent modules
The state of a system at any point in time depends on the
maintenance scheme that is administered on that system.
Often the maintenance plan is designed to optimize the
reliability of the system [9]. System availability and total
cost are also some of the criteria that are considered
during the maintenance design stage [10, 11].
The failure behaviour of the system components can be
predicted based on the component characteristics and the
maintenance plan. The dependability of the system can
then be obtained based on the failure behaviour of the
system components. This is done by obtaining the repair
rate and characteristics of the individual components
using the maintenance plan, and incorporating them into
the reliability model of the system.
Multiple phases of operation are observed in a system
that undergoes scheduled maintenance [12]. This is
because the periodic scheduled maintenance can cause
phase behaviour in a system, since at times of main-
tenance the system state changes abrubtly as component
failures are detected and repaired or upgraded. Therefore,
the modelling techniques used for modelling multiple-
phased systems may also be applied to systems that
undergo maintenance [6]. The dependability measures of
a system undergoing maintenance can be obtained once
the failure and maintenance characteristics of the system
components have been identi ed. The following depend-
ability measures for maintainable systems are considered
here:
1. The steady state or limiting pointwise availability of
the system
a ˆ lim
t!1 a
…t† …1†
2. Average availability over a maintenance cycle T. Thus
aT is de ned for a maintenance cycle (time period
between maintenance actions) T as
aT ˆ 1
T
…T¡M
0
a…t†dt …2†
where M is the amount of time needed to perform the
maintenance on the system.
In this section, several of the schemes that occur in
systems undergoing maintenance are considered and
these schemes are classi ed according to the solution
technique that would apply to them.
5.3.1 Scheduled maintenance and upgrade
Scheduled maintenance and system upgrade can be
modelled using the techniques applied to the modelling
of multi-phased systems with  xed durations [5, 13–15].
This is done by considering the scheduled maintenance as
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instantaneous repairs at the time of maintenance checks.
In the context of Markov modelling, the scheduled
maintenance can be modelled by readjusting the state
occupation probabilities after maintenance. In a broad
sense, the probabilities associated with the state in which
the maintained component is down should be allocated to
the state where everything else is identical to the former
state but the maintained component is up. If there are
failure sequence dependencies or minimal repair, then it
is necessary to take that into consideration in readjusting
the state occupation probabilities.
In the case of a system upgrade, not only will the
component in question be brought up to a perfect state but
its failure parameters may also change. This is because
the newer version of the component may have a different
failure rate. This is another attribute that should be taken
into consideration in the system Markov chain.
5.3.2 Repair upon failure
Where components (modules) are repaired upon failure,
if the repair of the component (module) in question is
independent, with an exponential distribution, then it is
possible to obtain the availability of that component
(module) by solving the Markov model in Fig. 7. In this
 gure, the Markov model has two states, one is the
operational state (Up) and the other is the failed state
(Down). The failure rate of the component is f and r is the
repair rate. Independent repair of a component (or
module) implies that there are no maintenance depen-
dencies between that component (or module) and the rest
of the system components. A module may consist of one
or more components. In Fig. 7, the module has only one
component.
If the repair of several components are interdependent,
then they cannot be analysed in separate models. They
should be modelled in a combined Markov model, and
their respective availability could then be obtained from
the solution of that Markov chain. Figure 8 shows the
Markov chain related to the hardware components
(remember that the  rst hardware had maintenance
priority over the second one). The state (hw1, hw2) is
where both of the hardware components are functional.
Hardware 1 (hw1) fails with a rate of fhw1. Upon the
failure of hardware 1, the system enters the state (hw2) in
which only hardware 2 is functional. There is a
probability of Dhw1 that the failure of hardware 1 will
be detected. If it is detected, it will be repaired with a rate
of rhw1. As can be seen in the  gure, when both of the
hardwares are in a failed state, hardware 1 is the  rst to be
maintained.
Figure 9 is the Markov chain for the valves. Scheduled
maintenance is always performed on both valves
together. However, if one fails and the failure is detected,
it is repaired and if both of them are failed, and their
failures are detected, they are repaired together. Note that
this is different from the hardware systems. In the case of
the hardware systems, the  rst hardware is repaired  rst
when both of the hardware systems are in a failed state.
5.3.3 Dealing with priority and implication issues
The priority and implication issues must be considered
while readjusting the state occupation probabilities after
maintenance. For instance, if component A must be
maintained before component B can be maintained, then
the state probabilities need to be readjusted so that the
probabilities of all states that have A or B components
down are allocated to the states that are identical in other
respects but the A and B components are both up.
6 SYSTEM-LEVEL SOLUTION
Once the availability measure of each independent
module within a fault tree has been obtained, it is easy
to  nd the availability measure for the entire system. This
Fig. 7 Markov model for independent repair of components
Fig. 8 Markov chain for the two hardwares
Fig. 9 Markov chain for the valves
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is done by considering each of the independent modules
as a basic event in the system fault tree with an
availability measure equal to that obtained from the
availability analysis of the module. The fault tree is then
solved as usual for the availability measure of the entire
system. It is important to note that the availability
measures used for all the modules must be the same
measure. It should be either the steady state availability
of each module or the average availability of each
module.
7 SOLUTION OF THE WATER DELUGE
SYSTEM
In this section, an availability analysis is conducted of the
water deluge system presented in Section 2. This analysis
is based on determining a maintenance schedule for the
system while it is in standby mode and  nding the steady
availability measures of the system.
Safety systems and other protection systems are often
in standby mode for long periods of time. They are
maintainable during this time period and demand may
occur at any random point of time. The availability of the
system is at its maximum immediately after its scheduled
maintenance. In fact, the  uctuations of the expected
availability of the system follow a stochastically similar
pattern in each period, which is identi ed by the time
period between two maintenance intervals. Because it is
assumed that demand may occur at any time during the
interval, the average availability of the support system is
the average availability of the system during a single
period. Figure 10 shows the conceptual  uctuations of the
average availability of a scheduled maintenance system
over time.
The maintenance dependencies of the valves are
shown in the fault free of the pump streams 4 with repair
condition constructs. Repair condition constructs imply
bidirectional maintenance implication constructs be-
tween their corresponding components. The correspond-
ing Markov chain for the valves is shown in Fig. 9. The
maintenance dependencies of the hardware systems are
shown in the fault tree of the computer system with the
maintenance priority construct 2. The Markov chain
associated with the failure behaviour of the hardware
systems is shown in Fig. 8. Since the  rst hardware has
maintenance priority over its spare, once the system
reaches a state in which both are failed, the  rst hardware
is repaired  rst. Note that if the failures are not detected,
the components will remain in a failed state until
scheduled maintenance.
The failure behaviour of the independent components
during each period, which is the time interval between
two maintenance procedures, is shown in Fig. 11. It is
assumed that if the failure of a component is detected, it is
repaired at the time of detection. The failure rate is
considered to be f and the repair rate is r. The probability
of detecting the occurred failure is D. Note that the failed
state of the components has been partitioned into failed
detected and failed undetected states. If the component
reaches the failed detected state, it will be repaired. If it
Fig. 10 Expected availability of a scheduled maintenance system with a maintenance period of T
Fig. 11 Markov chain showing the behaviour of the compo-
nents during each period
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fails and the failure is undetected, it will not be repaired
until scheduled maintenance occurs.
8 NUMERICAL SOLUTION OF THE WATER
DELUGE SYSTEM
In this section a set of failure and repair rates is
considered for each of the components of the water
deluge system and the models developed in the former
section are used to obtain the average availability of the
water deluge system during a period of two weeks or 336
hours. Table 1 shows the active and standby failure and
repair rates as well as the detection probability of the
components of the water deluge system. If the failure of a
component is detected, then it is repaired. Otherwise, the
component remains in a failed state until scheduled
maintenance occurs at the end of the two weeks.
The average availability of each component is obtained
when in the standby mode. The time period T is equal to
two weeks or 336 hours. The availability measures
obtained for each component are given in Table 2.
9 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a framework for incorporation of
maintenance into dynamic fault tree analysis. Different
maintenance schemes have been considered and con-
structs for modelling these schemes have been developed
in the context of dynamic fault tree analysis. The solution
of the maintainable system fault tree is obtained by
 nding the independent modules of the fault tree, solving
each independent module for its availability measure and
then combining the availability measures of the separate
modules to obtain the system availability.
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Table 1 Failure and repair rates for the water deluge system
Component name Standby failure rate Active failure rate Detection probability MTTR*
Processor 10¡5/h 5 £ 10¡4/h 0.5 3 h
Control software 0 1.2 £ 10¡5/h 0 1 day
Valves 1.42 £ 10¡5/h 5.3 £ 10¡4/h 0.2 4 h
Filters 3 £ 10¡6/h 3 £ 10¡6/h 0.1 6 h
Sensors 1.27 £ 10¡5/h 3.4 £ 10¡4/h 0.75 3 h
Diesel power supply 2.3 £ 10¡5/h 2.3 £ 10¡4/h 0 8 h
Electric power supply 10¡5/h 10¡4/h 0 6 h
Electric pump 7 £ 10¡6/h 7 £ 10¡4/h 0.5 1 day
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* MTTR, mean time to repair.
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